To reason about information flow, a new model is developed that describes how attacker beliefs change due to the attacker's observation of the execution of a probabilistic (or deterministic) program. The model enables compositional reasoning about information flow from attacks involving sequences of interactions. The model also supports a new metric for quantitative information flow that measures accuracy of an attacker's beliefs. Applying this new metric reveals inadequacies of traditional information flow metrics, which are based on reduction of uncertainty. However, the new metric is sufficiently general that it can be instantiated to measure either accuracy or uncertainty. The new metric can also be used to reason about misinformation; deterministic programs are shown to be incapable of producing misinformation. Additionally, programs in which nondeterministic choices are made by insiders, who collude with attackers, can be analyzed.
Introduction
Qualitative security properties, such as noninterference [13] , typically either prohibit any flow of information from a high security level to a lower level, or they allow any information to flow provided it passes through some release mechanism. For a program whose correctness requires flow from high to low, the former property is too restrictive and the latter can lead to unbounded leakage of information. Quantitative flow policies, such as "at most k bits leak per execution of the program", allow information flows but at restricted rates. Such policies are useful when analyzing programs whose nature requires that some-but not too much-information be leaked. Examples of these programs include guards, which sit at the boundary between trusted and untrusted systems, and password checkers.
Quantifying information flow is more difficult than it might seem. Consider a password checker PWC that sets an authentication flag a after checking a stored password p against a (guessed) password g supplied by the user.
PWC : if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0
For simplicity, suppose that the password is either A, B, or C. Suppose also that the user is actually an attacker attempting to discover the password, and he believes the password is overwhelmingly likely to be A but has a minuscule and equally likely chance to be either B or C. (This need not be an arbitrary assumption on the attacker's part; perhaps the attacker was told by a usually reliable informant.) If the attacker experiments by executing PWC and guessing A, he expects to observe that a equals 1 upon termination. Such a confirmation of the attacker's belief would seem to convey some small amount of information. But suppose that the informant was wrong: the real password is C. Then the attacker observes that a is equal to 0 and infers that A is not the password. Common sense dictates that his new belief is that B and C each have a 50% chance of being the password. The attacker's belief has greatly changedhe is surprised to discover the password is not A-so the outcome of this experiment conveys more information than the previous outcome. Thus, the information conveyed by executing PWC depends on what the attacker initially believed.
How much information flows from p to a in each of the above experiments? Answers to this question have traditionally been based on change in uncertainty [8, 31, 14, 2, 24, 3, 27] : information flow is measured by the reduction in uncertainty about secret data. Observe that, in the case where the password is C, the attacker initially is quite certain (though wrong) about the value of the password and after the experiment is rather uncertain about the value of the password; the change from "quite certain" to "rather uncertain" is an increase in uncertainty. So according to a metric based on reduction in uncertainty, no information flow occurred, which contradicts our intuition.
The problem with metrics based on uncertainty is twofold. First, they do not take accuracy into account. Accuracy and uncertainty are orthogonal properties of the attacker's belief-being certain does not make one correct-and as the password checking example illustrates, the amount of information flow depends on accuracy rather than on uncertainty. Second, uncertainty-based metrics are concerned with some unspecified agent's uncertainty rather than an attacker's. The unspecified agent is able to observe a probability distribution over secret input values but cannot observe the particular secret input used in the program execution. If the attacker were the unspecified agent, then there would be no reason in general to assume that the probability distribution the attacker uses is correct. Because the attacker's probability distribution is therefore subjective, it must be treated as a belief. Beliefs are thus an essential-though until now uninvestigated-component of information flow. This paper presents a new way of measuring information flow, based on these insights. Section 2 gives basic representations for beliefs and programs. Section 3 describes a model of the interaction between attackers and systems; it also describes how attackers update beliefs by observing execution of programs. Section 4 defines a new quantitative flow metric, based on information theory, that characterizes the amount of information flow due to changes in the accuracy of an attacker's belief. The metric can also be instantiated to measure change in uncertainty, and thus it generalizes previous information-flow metrics. The model and metric are formulated for use with any programming model that can be given a denotational semantics compatible with the representation of beliefs, and Section 5 illustrates with a particular programming language (while-programs plus probabilistic choice). Section 6 extends the model to programs in which nondeterministic choices are resolved by insiders, who are allowed to observe secret values. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes. This paper revises and expands an earlier version [6] that appeared in CSFW'05.
Incorporating Beliefs
A belief is a statement an agent makes about the state of the world, accompanied by some measure of how certain the agent is about the truthfulness of the statement. Agents will reason about probabilistic programs, so we begin by developing mathematical structures for representing probabilistic programs and beliefs.
Distributions
A frequency distribution is a function δ that maps a program state to a frequency, where a frequency is a non-negative real number. A frequency distribution is essentially an unnormalized probability distribution over program states; it is easier to define a programming language semantics using frequency distributions than using probability distributions [32] . 1 Henceforth, we write "distribution" to mean "frequency distribution". The set of all program states is State, and the set of all distributions is Dist. The structure of State is mostly unimportant; it can be instantiated according to the needs of any particular language or system. For our examples, states map variables to values, where Var and Val are both countable sets.
We write a state as a list of mappings; for example, (g → A, a → 0) is a state in which variable g has value A and a has value 0.
The mass in a distribution δ is the sum of frequencies:
A probability distribution has mass 1, but a frequency distribution may have any nonnegative mass. A point mass is a probability distribution that maps a single state to 1. It is denoted by placing a dot over that single state:
Programs
Execution of program S is described by a denotational semantics in which the meaning 
]σ Thus, the meaning of S over a distribution of inputs is completely determined by the meaning of S given a state as input. By defining programs in terms of how they operate on distributions we permit analysis of probabilistic programs. Section 5 shows how to build such a semantics.
Our examples use while-programs extended with a probabilistic choice construct. Let metavariables S, v, E, and B range over programs, variables, arithmetic expressions, and Boolean expressions, respectively. Evaluation of expressions is assumed side-effect free, but we do not otherwise prescribe their syntax or semantics. The syntax of the language is:
The operational semantics for the deterministic subset of this language is standard. Probabilistic choice S 1 p S 2 executes S 1 with probability p or S 2 with probability 1 − p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Labels and Projections
We need a way to identify secret data; confidentiality labels serve this purpose. For simplicity, assume there are only two labels: a label L that indicates low-confidentiality (public) data, and a label H that indicates high-confidentiality (secret) data. Assume that State is a product of two domains State L and State H , which contain the low-and high-labeled data, respectively. A low state is an element σ L ∈ State L ; a high state is an element σ H ∈ State H . The projection of state σ ∈ State onto State L is denoted σ L; this is the part of σ visible to the attacker. Projection onto State H , the part of σ not visible to the attacker, is denoted σ H. Each variable in a program is subscripted by a label to indicate the confidentiality of the information stored in that variable; for example, x L is a variable that contains low information. For convenience, let variable l be labeled L and variable h be labeled H.
States σ and σ are low-equivalent, written σ ≈ L σ , if they have the same low projection:
Distributions also have projections. Let δ be a distribution and σ L a low state. Then (δ L)(σ L ) is the combined frequency of those states whose low projection is σ L :
High projection and high equivalence are defined by replacing occurrences of L with H in the definitions above.
Belief Representation
To be usable in our framework, a belief representation must support certain natural operations. Let b and b be beliefs ranging over sets of possible worlds W and W , respectively, where a world is an elementary outcome about which beliefs can be held. 2. Belief update b|U is the belief that results when b is updated to include new information that the actual world is in a set U ⊆ W of possible worlds.
is a real number r ≥ 0 quantifying differences between b and b .
While the results in this paper are, for the most part, independent of any particular representation, the rest of this paper uses distributions to represent beliefs. High states are the possible worlds for beliefs, and a belief is a probability distribution over high states.
Whereas distributions correspond to positive measures, beliefs correspond to probability measures. Probability measures are well-studied as a belief representation [18] , and they have several advantages here: they are familiar, quantitative, support the operations required above, and admit a programming language semantics (as shown in Section 5). There is also a nice justification for the numbers they produce: roughly, b(σ) characterizes the amount of money an attacker should be willing to bet that σ is the actual state of the system [18] . Other choices of belief representation could include belief functions or sets of probability measures [18] . While these are more expressive than probability measures, it is more complicated to define the required operations for them.
For belief product ⊗, we employ a distribution product ⊗ of two distributions δ 1 : A → R + and δ 2 : B → R + , with A and B disjoint:
It is easy to check that if b and b are beliefs, b ⊗ b is too. For belief update |, we use distribution conditioning:
For belief distance D we use relative entropy, an information-theoretic metric [20] for the distance between distributions.
The base of the logarithm in D can be chosen arbitrarily; we use base 2 and write lg to indicate log 2 , making bits the unit of measurement for distance. The relative entropy of b to b is the expected inefficiency (that is, the number of additional bits that must be sent) of an optimal code that is constructed by assuming an inaccurate distribution over symbols b when the real distribution is b [7] . Like an analytic metric, D(b b ) is always at least zero and D(b b ) equals zero only when b = b .
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Relative entropy has the property that if b (σ) > 0 and b(σ) = 0, then D(b b ) = ∞. Intuitively, b is "infinitely surprising" because it regards σ as possible whereas b regards σ as impossible. To avoid this anomaly, beliefs may be required to satisfy an admissibility restriction, which ensures that attackers do not initially believe that certain states are impossible. For example, a belief might be restricted such that it never differs by more than a factor of from a uniform distribution. Or, the attacker's belief may be required to be a maximal entropy distribution [7] with respect to attackerspecified constraints. Other admissibility restrictions may be substituted for these when stronger assumptions can be made about attacker beliefs.
Experiments
We formalize as an experiment how an attacker, an agent that reasons about secret data, revises his beliefs from interaction with a system, an agent that executes programs. The attacker should not learn about the high input to the program but is allowed to observe (and perhaps influence) low inputs and outputs. Other agents (a system operator, other users of the system with their own high data, an informant upon which the attacker relies, etc.) might be involved when an attacker interacts with a system; however, it suffices to condense all of these to just the attacker and the system.
We are chiefly interested in the program S with which the attacker is interacting, and we conservatively assume that the attacker knows the source code of S. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that S always terminates and that it never modifies the high state. Section 3.4 discusses how both restrictions can be lifted without significant changes.
Experiment Protocol
Formally, an experiment E is described by a tuple:
where S is the program, b H is the attacker's belief, σ H is the high projection of the initial state, and σ L is the low projection of the initial state. The protocol for experiments, which uses some notation defined below, is summarized in Figure 1 . Here is a justification for the protocol. 3. The attacker predicts the output distribution:
4. The system executes the program S, which produces a state σ ∈ δ as output, where
The attacker observes the low projection of the output state: o = σ L.
The attacker infers a postbelief:
An attacker's prebelief, describing his belief at the beginning of the experiment (step 1), may be chosen arbitrarily (subject to an admissibility restriction as in Section 2.4) or may be informed by previous experiments. In a series of experiments, the postbelief from one experiment typically becomes the prebelief to the next. The attacker might even choose a prebelief b H that contradicts his true subjective probability distribution for the state, and this gives our analysis additional power by allowing the attacker to conduct experiments to answer questions such as "What would happen if I were to believe b H ?"
The system chooses σ H (step 2a), the high projection of the initial state, and this part of the state might remain constant from one experiment to the next or might vary. For example, Unix passwords do not usually change frequently, but the output displayed on an RSA SecurID token changes each minute. We conservatively assume that the attacker chooses all of σ L (step 2b), the low projection of the initial state. 4 This gives the attacker additional power in controlling execution of the program, which he can use to attempt to maximize the amount of information flow. The attacker's choice of σ L is thus likely to be influenced by b H , but for generality, we do not require there be such a strategy.
Using the semantics of S along with prebelief b H as a distribution on high input, the attacker conducts a "thought experiment" to generate a prediction of the output distribution (step 3). We define prediction δ A to correlate the output state with the high input state:
Program S is executed (step 4) only once in each experiment; multiple executions are modeled by multiple experiments. The meaning of S given inputs σ L and σ H is an output distribution δ :
From δ the attacker makes an observation, which is a low projection of an output state. Probabilistic programs may yield many possible output states, but in a single execution of the program, only one output state is actually produced. This output state σ is produced with frequency δ (σ ). We write:
σ ∈ δ to denote that σ is in the support of (i.e., has positive frequency according to) δ . In a single experiment, the attacker is allowed only a single observation. The observation o resulting from σ is:
Finally, the attacker incorporates any new inferences that can be made from observation o by conditioning prediction δ A . The result is projected to H to produce the attacker's postbelief b H (step 5):
Here, conditioning operator δ|o is defined in terms of conditioning operator δ|U . The new operator removes all mass in distribution δ that is inconsistent with observation o, then normalizes the result:
Password Checking as an Experiment
Our experiment model allows the informal reasoning in Section 1 to be made precise. For example, consider the password checker; adding confidentiality labels yields:
The attacker begins an experiment by choosing prebelief b H , perhaps as specified in the column labeled b H of Table 1 . Next, the system chooses initial high projection σ H , and the attacker chooses initial low projection σ L . In the first experiment in Section 1, the password was A, so the system chooses σ H = (p → A). Similarly, the attacker chooses σ L = (g → A, a → 0). (The initial value of a is actually irrelevant, since it is never used by the program and a is set along all control paths.) Next, the system executes PWC . Output distribution δ is a point mass at the state σ = (p → A, g → A, a → 1); the semantics in Section 5 will validate this intuition. Since σ is the only state that can be sampled from δ , the attacker's observation o 1 is σ L = (g → A, a → 1).
Finally, the attacker infers a postbelief. He conducts a thought experiment, predicting an output distribution 
distribution is intuitively correct: the attacker believes that he has a 98% chance of being authenticated, whereas 1% of the time he will fail to be authenticated because the password is B, and another 1% because it is C. The attacker conditions prediction δ A on observation o 1 , obtaining δ A |o 1 , also shown in Table 2 . Projecting to high yields the attacker's postbelief b H1 , shown in Table 1 . This postbelief is what the informal reasoning in Section 1 suggested: the attacker is certain that the password is A.
The second experiment in Section 1 can also be formalized. In it, b H and σ L remain the same as before, but σ H becomes (p → C). Observation o 2 is therefore the point mass at (g → A, a → 0). Prediction δ A remains unchanged, and conditioned on o 2 it becomes δ A |o 2 , shown in Table 2 . Projecting to high yields the new postbelief b H2 in Table 1 . This postbelief again agrees with the informal reasoning: the attacker believes that there is a 50% chance each for the password to be B or C.
Bayesian Belief Revision
The formula the attacker uses to infer a postbelief is an application of Bayesian inference, which is a standard technique in applied statistics for making inferences when uncertainty is made explicit through probability models [12] . The attacker therefore reasons rationally, according to Halpern's rationality axioms [17] , though the literature on human behavior shows that this is not always the same as human reasoning [21, 22] .
Let belief revision operator B yield the postbelief from an experiment E = S, b H , σ H , σ L , given observation o:
We write b H ∈ B(E) to denote that there exists some o for which b H = B(E, o).
Recall Bayes' rule for updating a hypothesis Hyp with an observation obs:
Hyp Pr(Hyp )Pr(obs|Hyp )
In our model, the attacker's hypothesis is about the values of high states, so the domain of hypotheses is State H. Therefore Pr(Hyp), the probability the attacker ascribes to a particular hypothesis σ H , is modeled by b H (σ H ). The probability Pr(obs|Hyp) the attacker ascribes to an observation given the assumed truth of a hypothesis is modeled by the program semantics: the probability of an observation o given an assumed high
tiating Bayes' rule on these probability models yields Bayesian inference BI (E, o), which is Pr(σ H |o):
With this instantiation, we can show that the experiment protocol leads an attacker to update his belief according to Bayesian inference.
Proof.
In Appendix B.
Mutable High State and Nontermination
Section 3.1 invokes two simplifying assumptions about program S: it never modifies high input, and it always terminates. We now dispense with these technical issues.
To eliminate the first assumption, note that if S were to modify the high state, the attacker's prediction δ A would correlate high outputs with low outputs. However, to calculate a postbelief (in step 5), δ A must correlate high inputs with low outputs. So our experiment protocol requires the high input state be preserved in δ A . Informally, we can do this by keeping a copy of the initial high inputs in the program state. This copy is never modified by the program. Thus, the copy is preserved in the final output state, and the attacker can again establish a correlation between high inputs and low outputs. Technical details are given in Appendix A.
To eliminate the second assumption, note that program S must terminate for an attacker to obtain a low state as an observation when executing S. There are two ways to model the observation in the case of nontermination, depending on whether the attacker can detect nontermination. If the attacker has an oracle that decides nontermination, then nontermination can be modeled in the standard denotational style with a state ⊥ representing the divergent state. Details of this approach are given in Appendix A. An attacker that cannot detect nontermination is more difficult to model. At some point during the execution of the program, he may stop waiting for the program to terminate and declare that he has observed nontermination. However, he may be incorrect in doing so-leading to beliefs about nontermination and instruction timings. The interaction of these beliefs with beliefs about high inputs is complex; we leave this for future work.
Measuring Information Flow
The informal analysis of PWC in Section 1 suggests that information flow corresponds to an improvement in the accuracy of an attacker's belief. We use change in accuracy, as measured by belief distance D, to quantify information flow. 
Information Flow from an Outcome
We define the amount of information flow Q caused by outcome b H of experiment E as the difference of these two quantities:
Thus the amount of information flow Q is the improvement in the accuracy of the attacker's belief. This amount can positive or negative; we defer discussion of negative flow to Section 4.3. Since D is instantiated with relative entropy, the unit of measurement for Q is (information-theoretic) bits.
With an additional definition from information theory, a more consequential characterization of Q is possible. Let I δ (F ) denote the information contained in event F drawn from probability distribution δ:
Information is sometimes called "surprise" because I measures how surprising an event is; for example, when an event that has probability 1 occurs, no information (0 bits) is conveyed because the occurrence is completely unsurprising. For an attacker, the outcome of an experiment involves two unknowns: the initial high state σ H and the probabilistic choices made by the program. Let
measures the information contained in o about both unknowns, but I δ S (o) measures only the probabilistic choices made by the program. 5 For programs that make no probabilistic choices, δ A contains information about only the initial high state, and δ S is a point mass at some state σ such that σ L = o. So the amount of information I δ S (o) is 0. For probabilistic programs,
is generally not equal to 0; subtracting it removes all the information contained in I δ A (o) that is solely about the results of probabilistic choices, leaving information about high inputs only.
The following theorem states that Q measures the information about high input σ H contained in observation o.
Definitions of D and point mass
As an example, consider the experiments involving PWC in Section 3.2. The first experiment E 1 has the attacker correctly guess the password A, so:
where Table 1 defines b H and the other beliefs about to be used. Only one outcome, b H1 , is possible from this experiment. We calculate the amount of flow from this outcome, letting σ H = (p → A):
This small flow makes sense because the outcome has only confirmed something the attacker already believed to be almost certainly true. In experiment E 2 the attacker guesses incorrectly:
Again, only one outcome is possible from this experiment, and calculating Q(E 2 , b H2 ) yields an information flow of 5.6439 bits. This higher information flow makes sense, because the attacker's postbelief is much closer to correctly identifying the high state. The attacker's prebelief b H ascribed a 0.02 probability to the event [p = A], and the information of an event with probability 0.02 is 5.6439. This suggests that Q is the right metric for the information about high input contained in the observation.
The information flow of 5.6439 bits in experiment E 2 might seem surprisingly high. At most two bits are required to store password p in memory, so why does the program leak more than five bits? Here, the greater leakage occurs because the attacker's belief is not uniform. A uniform prebelief (ascribing 1/3 probability to each password A, B, and C) would, in a series of experiments, cause the attacker to learn a total of lg 3 ≈ 1.6 bits. However, belief b H is more erroneous than the uniform belief, so a larger amount of information is required to correct it.
An uncertainty-based definition for information flow does not produce a reasonable leakage for this experiment. The attacker's initial uncertainty about p is H(b H ) = 0.1614 bits, where H is the information-theoretic metric of entropy, or uncertainty, in a probability distribution δ:
In the second experiment, the attacker's final uncertainty about p is H(b H2 ) = 1. The reduction in uncertainty is 0.1614−1 = −0.8386. An uncertainty-based analysis, such as Denning's [8] , would interpret this negative quantity as an absence of information flow. But this is clearly not the case-the attacker's belief has been guided closer to reality by the experiment. The uncertainty-based analysis ignores reality by measuring b H and b H2 against themselves only, instead of against the high state σ H .
Interpreting Metric Q
According to Theorem 2, metric Q correctly measures the amount of information flow, in bits. But what does it mean to leak one bit of information? The next theorem states that k bits of leakage correspond to a k-fold doubling of the probability that the attacker ascribes to reality.
Suppose an attacker were to guess what reality is by sampling from his belief b H ; the probability he guesses correctly is b H (σ H ). Thus, by Theorem 3, one bit of leakage makes the attacker twice as likely to guess correctly. This reveals an interesting analogy with the uncertainty-based definition. In it, one bit of leakage corresponds to the attacker becoming twice as certain about the high state, though he may, as the example in Section 4.1 shows, become certain about the wrong high state. However, one bit of leakage in our accuracy-based definition corresponds to the attacker becoming twice as certain about the correct high state. Table 3 Analysis of FLIP 
Usually, FLIP sets l to be h, so the attacker will expect this to be the case. Executions in which this occurs will cause his postbelief to be more accurate, but may cause his uncertainty to either increase or decrease, depending on his prebelief; when uncertainty increases, an uncertainty metric would mistakenly say that no flow has occurred. With probability 0.01, FLIP produces an execution that fools the attacker and sets l to be ¬h, causing his belief to become less accurate. The decrease in accuracy results in misinformation, which is a negative information flow. When the attacker's prebelief is almost completely accurate, such executions will make him more uncertain. But when the attacker's prebelief is uniform, executions that result in misinformation will make him less uncertain; when uncertainty decreases, an uncertainty metric would mistakenly say that flow has occurred. Table 3 concretely demonstrates the orthogonality of accuracy and uncertainty. The quadrant labels refer to figure 2. The attacker's prebelief b H , observation o, and resulting postbelief b H are given in the top half of the table. In the bottom half of the table, increase in accuracy is calculated using information flow metric Q, and reduction in uncertainty is calculated using the difference in entropy H(b H ) − H(b H ). The symmetries in the bottom half of the table are a result of the symmetries between prebeliefs and postbeliefs. Quadrants II and IV, for example, have exchanged these beliefs, which for both metrics has the effect of negating the amount of information flow.
The probabilistic choice in FLIP is essential for producing misinformation, as shown by the following theorem. Let Det be the set of syntactically deterministic programs, i.e., programs that do not contain any probabilistic choice. Because they lack a source of randomness, these programs cannot decrease the accuracy of an attacker's belief.
Emulating Uncertainty
The accuracy metric of Section 4.1 generalizes uncertainty metrics. Informally, this is because uncertainty metrics recognize only two distributions (belief before and after execution), whereas our framework recognizes these plus one additional distribution (reality). By ignoring reality, our framework can produce the same results as many uncertainty metrics. Here we show how to emulate the metric of Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [5] . Their metric states that the amount of information flow
where H is the generalization of the entropy function from Section 4.1 to conditional entropy [7] . 6 First, to instantiate our framework to that of Clark et al., we force our framework to ignore reality by introducing an admissibility restriction (c.f. Section 2.4): prebeliefs must be identical to the system's chosen high input distribution. This means that prebeliefs must be correct; there can be no error in the attacker's estimate of the probability distribution on high inputs.
Second, we adjust the definition of belief. The uncertainty model of Clark et al. calculates information flow as an expectation over a probability distribution on both low and high inputs. We could model this using the techniques about to be introduced in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, but because of the admissibility restriction just made, it is equivalent and simpler to allow beliefs to range over low state as well as high state. As before, we assume that high state remains constant using the copying technique of Section 3.4. Since beliefs now include low state, we must also apply this technique to assure that the initial values of low variables are preserved in the state. Let 
Observe that this instantiation ignores argument b , the belief representing reality. This yields that amount of information flow Q is the same as uncertainty metric L.
Theorem 5
Expected Flow for an Experiment
Since an experiment on a probabilistic program can produce many observations, and therefore many outcomes, it is desirable to characterize expected flow over those outcomes. So we define expected flow Q E over all observations from experiment E:
is the expected value, with respect to distribution δ, of expression X with free variable σ; and B is the belief revision operator from Section 3.3. Expected flow is useful in analyzing probabilistic programs. Consider a faulty password checker:
if p = g then a := 1 else a := 0; a := ¬a 0.1 skip With probability 0.1, FPWC inverts the authentication flag. Can this program be expected to confound attackers-does FPWC leak less expected information than PWC ? This question can be answered by comparing the expected flow from FPWC Table 4 Leakage of PWC and FPWC
to the flow of PWC . Table 4 gives information flows from FPWC for experiments E F 1 and E F 2 , which are identical to E 1 and E 2 from Section 4.1, except that they execute FPWC instead of PWC . Observations (a → 0) and (a → 1) correspond to an execution where the value of a is inverted. The flow for the outcomes resulting from these observations is negative, indicating that the program is giving the attacker misinformation. Note that, for both pairs of experiments in Table 4 , the expected flow of FPWC is less than the flow of PWC . We have confirmed that the random corruption of a makes it more difficult for the attacker to increase the accuracy of his belief.
Expected flow can be conservatively approximated by conditioning on a single distribution rather than conditioning on many observations. Conditioning δ on δ L has the effect of making the low projection of δ identical to δ L , while leaving the high projection of
A bound on expected flow is then calculated as follows. Given experiment E = S, b H , σ H , σ L , let δ be the distribution that results from the system executing S as in step 4 of the experiment protocol, i.e., δ = [[S]](σ L ⊗σ H ). In the experiment protocol, an attacker would observe the low projection of a state from δ . But suppose that the attacker instead observed the low projection of δ itself. (This projection is the distribution over observations that the attacker would approach if he continued to repeat E.) Let e H be the postbelief that results from conditioning on this distribution, as in step 5 of the protocol:
Intuitively, e H is the attacker's expected postbelief with respect to δ L. The amount of information flow from expected postbelief e H then bounds the expected amount of information flow, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6
Let:
As an example, consider experiment E F 2 . Calculating the attacker's expected postbelief e H in this experiment yields e H = 0.8601, 0.0699, 0.0699 , using the postbelief notation from Section 4.3. Bound Q(E, e H ) from Theorem 6 is thus 6.4264 bits, which is indeed greater than expected flow Q E as calculated in Table 4 .
Expected Flow over All Experiments
Uncertainty-based metrics typically consider the expected information flow over all experiments, rather than the flow in a single experiment. An analysis, like ours, based on single experiments allows a more expressive language of security properties in which particular inputs or experiments can be considered. Moreover, our analysis can be extended to calculate expected flow over all experiments.
Rather than choosing particular high and low input states σ H and σ L , the system and the attacker may choose distributions δ H and δ L over high and low states, respectively. These distributions are sampled to produce the initial input state. Taking the expectation in Q E with respect to σ H , σ L and o then yields the expected flow over all experiments.
This extension also increases the expressive power of the experiment model. A distribution over low inputs allows the attacker to use a randomized guessing strategy. His distribution might also be a function of his belief, though we leave investigation of such attacker strategies as future work. A distribution over high inputs could be used, for example, to determine the expected flow of the password checker when users' choice of passwords can be described by a distribution.
Maximum Information Flow
System designers are likely to want to limit the maximum possible information flow. We characterize the maximum amount of information flow that program S can cause in a single outcome as the maximum amount of flow from any outcome of any experiment E = S, b H , σ H , σ L on S:
Consider applying Q max to PWC . Assume that b H is a uniform distribution, representing a lack of belief for any particular password, over k-bit passwords. If the attacker guesses correctly, then according to Q max , the maximum leakage is k bits. But if the attacker guesses incorrectly, PWC can leak at most k − lg(2 k − 1) bits in an outcome; for k > 12 this is less than 0.0001 bits.
Uncertainty metrics typically declare that the maximum possible information flow is lg |State H |; this is the number of bits necessary to store the high state. This was true for the example of k-bit passwords above. However, as experiment E 2 from Section 4.1 shows, this declaration is valid only if the attacker's prebelief is no more inaccurate 
than the uniform distribution. Thus uncertainty metrics make an implicit restriction on attacker beliefs that our accuracy metric does not.
Repeated Experiments
Nothing precludes performing a series of experiments. The most interesting case has the attacker return to step 2b of the experiment protocol in Figure 1 after updating his belief in step 5; that is, the system keeps the high input to the program constant, and the attacker is allowed to check new low inputs based on the results of previous experiments. Suppose that experiment E 2 from Section 4.1 is conducted and repeated with σ L = (g → B). Then the attacker's belief about the password evolves as shown in Table 5 . Summing the information flow for each experiment yields a total information flow of 6.6439. This total corresponds to what Q would calculate for a single experiment, if that experiment changed prebelief b H to postbelief b H2 , where b H2 is the attacker's final postbelief in Table 5 :
This example suggests a general theorem stating that the postbelief from a series of experiments, where the postbelief from one experiment becomes the prebelief to the next, contains all the information learned during the series. Let E i = S, b Hi , σ H , σ Li be the i th experiment in the series, and let b Hi be the outcome from E i . Let prebelief b Hi in experiment E i be chosen as postbelief b Hi−1 from experiment E i−1 . Let b H1 be the attacker's prebelief for the entire series. Let n be the length of the series.
Theorem 7
Immediate by the definition of Q and arithmetic.
Number of Experiments
Attackers conduct experiments to refine their beliefs. This suggests another measurement of the security of a program: the number of experiments required for an attacker to refine his belief to within some distance of reality. For simplicity, assume that program S is deterministic 7 , and thus that only one observation is possible from an experiment. Then belief revision B (from Section 3.3) can be used as a function from experiments to postbeliefs. Let A : Belief → State L be the attacker's strategy for choosing low inputs based on his beliefs. Define the i th iteration of B as B i :
Then the number of experiments N needed to achieve a postbelief within distance of reality is:
As discussed in Section 4.2, when an attacker's belief is k bits distant from reality, the probability he ascribes to the correct high state is 1/2 k . If the attacker were to "guess" a high state by sampling from his belief, he would therefore guess correctly with probability 1/2 after N experiments.
If a metric M on State H is available, then the attacker may approximate reality by establishing a high certainty on a state near to the correct high state. For example, if the high state is a Cartesian coordinate, we may wish to establish the security policy that the attacker should never have a high degree of certainty on the correct coordinate nor any coordinates within some Cartesian distance. Let ball (σ H ) be all the high states within distance γ of σ H :
Then the number of experiments needed to achieve some distance from some ball γ around reality is:
Language Semantics
The last piece required for our framework is a semantics [[S]] in which programs denote functions that map distributions to distributions. Here we build such a semantics in two stages. First, we build a simpler semantics that maps states to distributions. Second, we lift the simpler semantics so that it operates on distributions. Figure 4 Semantics of programs in distributions 
Figure 3 Semantics of programs in states
The semantics of while and sequential composition S 1 ; S 2 use lifting operator * , which lifts function d : State → Dist to function d * : Dist → Dist, as suggested by Section 2.2:
where the equality follows from η-reduction, and · and + are used as pointwise operators:
Lifted d * is thus the expected value (which is a distribution) of d with respect to distribution δ.
To ensure that the fixed point for while exists, we must verify that Dist is a complete partial order with a bottom element and that [[·]] is continuous. We omit the proof here, as it is a consequence of a theorem proved by Kozen [23] . But we note that a key step is to strengthen the definition of Dist from Section 2.1 to be {δ | δ ∈ State → [0, 1] ∧ δ ≤ 1}. This makes distributions correspond to subprobability measures, and it is easy to check that the semantics produces subprobability measures as output. The bottom element is then λσ . 0, and the ordering relation on distributions is pointwise. Note that the definition of Belief from Section 2.4 remains unchanged, since it did not depend on Dist. Thus beliefs still correspond to probability measures. Anywhere that the result of the program semantics must be upgraded to a belief (i.e., from a subprobability to a probability), we rely on the technique of Section 3.4 to handle nontermination. The most important occurrence of this is in step 5 of the experiment protocol in Figure 1 .
The final program construct is probabilistic choice, S 1 p S 2 , where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The semantics multiplies the probability of choosing a side S i with the frequency that S i produces a particular output state σ . Since the same state σ might actually be produced by both sides of the choice, the frequency of its occurrence is the sum of the frequency from either side:
, which can be simplified to the formula in Figure 3 .
To lift the semantics in Figure 3 and define [[S]] : Dist → Dist, we again employ lifting operator * :
Interpreting this definition, note there are many states σ in which S could begin execution, and all of them could potentially terminate in state σ. So to compute ([[S]]δ)(σ), we take a weighted average over all input states σ . The weights are δ(σ ), which describes how likely σ is to be used as the input state. With σ as input, S terminates in state σ with frequency (
[[S]]σ )(σ).
Applying this definition to the semantics in Figure 3 yields [[S]]δ, shown in Figure 4 . This lifted semantics corresponds directly to a semantics given by Kozen [23] , which interprets programs as continuous linear operators on measures. Our semantics uses an extension of the distribution conditioning operator | to Boolean expressions. Whereas distribution conditioning produces a normalized distribution, Boolean expression conditioning produces an unnormalized distribution:
By producing unnormalized distributions as part of the meaning of if and while statements, we track the frequency with which each branch of the statement is chosen.
Insider Choice
The experiment protocol in Section 3 involved two agents, the attacker and the system. Consider a third agent called the insider, whose goal is to help the attacker learn secret information. The insider and attacker may initially communicate to establish a strategy to achieve this goal. Once execution begins, the insider cannot directly communicate with the attacker, but the insider is able to observe and influence the execution of programs. He can observe both the high and low components of the program state. His ability to influence execution is modeled by a new programming language construct, insider choice, denoted S 1 S 2 :
The insider, rather than the system, is the entity who executes this kind of choice. The insider chooses either S 1 or S 2 and execution continues with the chosen program.
As an example of insider choice, consider program L1 :
The second line of L1 allows the insider to choose between two values for variable l.
Since the insider is allowed to observe the high component of the state, he can observe the parity of h and choose to set l equal to it, thus leaking the parity of h. The insider in this example made a deterministic choice. More generally, insiders may also make probabilistic choices. For example, an insider could flip a fair coin then choose the left side on heads or the right side on tails. This can be seen as an extension of probabilistic choice, in which the probability is a function of the program state rather than just a constant. Thus insider choice can also represent the behavior of normal programs without the influence of an insider.
Insider Functions
Formally, an insider is a function I ∈ Insider where:
The value of I(σ) is the probability with which the left-hand side of the insider choice is taken. For example, insider function I L1 leaks the value of h in program L1 with probability 0.99:
In a program with multiple syntactic occurrences of insider choice, a single insider function can encode different probabilities for each such occurrence, assuming that the program state encodes the program counter. Insider functions are able to model a range of powers that an insider might have, if those powers can be encoded into the program state. For example, suppose that the operational semantics of the language guarantees that for every variable x, the previous value of x (that is, the value that was assigned to it before its current value was assigned) is preserved in a variablex. Then insider functions can make decisions based on past state by reading previous values. This is similar to the idea of history variables [1] . In the following program, the insider leaks the initial parity of h.
LP : h := h mod 2;
h := 0; l := 0 l := 1 Figure 5 Insider semantics Figure 6 Insider semantics for distributions
The insider function that accomplishes this is:
Note that without access to history variableh, the insider is unable to leak the initial parity of h because this information is removed from the state when h is assigned the value 0. Similarly, insiders who can predict the values of variables in the future are modeled by the addition of prophecy variables [1] . Insiders with limited computational resources can be modeled by further restricting Insider. For example, suppose that insiders are allowed only polynomial time to make a choice. Then insider functions could be replaced by polynomially time-bounded Turing machines, where the input to the machine is the input σ to the insider function, and the output of the machine is used as the output of the insider function.
Semantics and Experiments

Formal semantics [[S]] :
Insider → State → Dist is given in Figure 5 . The only place in the semantics that the insider function is used is in the semantics of S 1 S 2 , and the semantics never modifies the insider function. Due to this second-class nature of insider functions, and for improved readability, we use a subscript notation for the insider 3. The attacker predicts the output distribution:
4. The system and insider execute the program S, which produces a state σ ∈ δ as output, where
The attacker infers a postbelief:
We can lift the semantics to operate on distributions as shown in Figure 6 . The lifted insider function is defined as:
The experiment protocol in Section 3.1 can be extended to include insiders, as shown in Figure 7 . Note that the attacker uses insider function I when conducting the thought-experiment. This function thus encodes choices that the insider and attacker have agreed upon in advance.
Security Conditions
Observational determinism [30, 33, 41 ] is a security condition for nondeterministic systems that generalizes noninterference [13] . We can state a probabilistic generalization of observational determinism that is applicable to our insider model. Let the set of programs satisfying observational determinism be denoted ObsDet. A program S satisfies observational determinism exactly when S behaves as a function from a low input state to a low output distribution, with respect to any insider and high input:
Observational determinism is equivalent to zero information flow in the insider model. That is, a program S satisfies observational determinism exactly when all experiments over S leak exactly 0 bits of information.
In Appendix B.
This theorem provides evidence that observational determinism is the right absolute security condition for nondeterministic systems. (On the other hand, this theorem also shows that observational determinism is too strong to be applicable to programs that require information flow, such as PWC .)
Other nondeterministic security conditions, such as generalized noninterference (GNI) [26] , are already known to allow leakage of information [36] . Our model of insider choice allows this leakage to be quantified, which further demonstrates the weakness of such security conditions. A program S satisfies GNI when S behaves as a relation on a low input state and low output distributions, with respect to any insider and high input:
Consider program LH , which can be shown to be in GNI:
Using insider function I LH (σ) = 1, this program always leaks the value of h. Unless the attacker already has a perfectly accurate belief about h, this is a positive (and nonzero) amount of leakage. So even though the program is secure according to GNI, an insider can refine the program to be insecure. This weakness is known as the refinement paradox [33] . Insiders therefore introduce a kind of nondeterminism that is not secure under refinement.
Related Work
We believe the work reported herein is the first to address attacker beliefs in quantifying information flow. Perhaps the earliest published connection between information theory and information flow is Denning [8] , which demonstrates the analysis of a few particular assignment and if statements by using entropy to calculate leakage. Millen [31] , using deterministic state machines, proves that a system satisfies noninterference exactly when the mutual information between certain inputs and outputs is zero. He also proposes mutual information as a metric for information flow, but he does not show how to compute the amount of flow for programs. Wittbold and Johnson [40] introduce nondeducibility on strategies, an extension of Sutherland's nondeducibility [34] . Wittbold and Johnson observe that if a program is run multiple times and feedback between runs is allowed, then information can be leaked by coding schemes across multiple runs. A system that is nondeducible on strategies has no noiseless communication channels between high input and low output, even in the presence of feedback. Our insider framework can quantify the leakage due to strategies that are encodable as insider functions.
The flow model (FM) is a security property first given by McLean [29] and later given a quantitative formalization by Gray [14] , who called it the Applied Flow Model.
The FM stipulates that the probability of a low output may depend on previous low outputs, but not on previous high outputs. Gray formalizes this in the context of probabilistic state machines, and he relates noninterference to the rate of maximum flow between high and low. Browne [2] develops a novel application of the idea behind the Turing test to characterize information flow: a system passes Browne's Turing test exactly when for all finite lengths of time, the information flow over that time is zero.
Volpano [35] gives a type system that can be used to establish the security of password checking and one-way functions such as MD5 and SHA1. Noninterference does not allow such functions to be typed, so this type system is an improvement over previous type systems. However, the type system does not allow a general analysis of quantitative information flow. Volpano and Smith [37] give another type system that enforces relative secrecy, which requires that well-typed programs cannot leak confidential data in polynomial time.
Weber [38] defines n-limited security, which allows declassification at a rate that depends, in part, on the size n of a buffer shared by the high and low projections of a state. Lowe [24] defines the information flow quantity of a process with two users H and L to be the number of behaviors of H that L can distinguish. When there are n such distinguishable behaviors, H can use them to transmit lg n bits to L. These both measure the size of channels rather than accuracy of belief.
Halpern and Tuttle [19] introduce a framework for reasoning about knowledge and probability based on three kinds of adversaries: adversaries who make nondeterministic choices, adversaries who represent the knowledge of the opponent, and adversaries who control timing. Our insiders can be seen as an instantiation of this framework. The insider choice and insider function constitute an adversary who makes nondeterministic choices, and each of the models of the insider's power in Section 6.1 correspond to an adversary representing the knowledge of the opponent. Gray and Syverson [15] apply the Halpern-Tuttle framework to reason about qualitative security of probabilistic systems. They relate their security condition to probabilistic noninterference [14] and information theory. Halpern and O'Neill [16] construct a framework for reasoning about secrecy that generalizes many previous results on qualitative and probabilistic, but not quantitative, security. Their framework, like ours, uses subjective probability distributions.
Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky [9] relax noninterference to approximate noninterference, where "approximate" is a quantified measure of the similarity of two processes in a process algebra. Similarity is measured using the supremum norm over the difference of the probability distributions the processes create on memory. They show how to interpret this quantity as a probability on an attacker's ability to distinguish two processes from a finite number of tests, in the sense of statistical hypothesis testing. Finally, the paper explores how to build an abstract interpretation that allows approximation of the confinement of a process. Their more recent work [10] generalizes this to measuring approximate confinement in probabilistic transition systems.
Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [4] apply information theory to the analysis of whileprograms. They develop a static analysis that provides bounds on the amount of information that can be leaked by a program. The metric for information leakage is based on conditional entropy; the analysis consists of a dataflow analysis, which computes a use-def graph, accompanied by a set of syntax-directed inference rules, which calculate leakage bounds. In other work [3] , the same authors investigate other leakage metrics, settling on conditional mutual information as an appropriate metric for measuring flow in probabilistic languages; they do not consider relative entropy. Mutual information is always at least 0, so unlike relative entropy it cannot represent misinformation. As noted in Section 4.4, this uncertainty-based definition requires a strong admissibility restriction: the attacker's prebelief must be the same distribution from which the system generates the high input. Malacaria [25] extends this line of work by classifying the rate of leakage of loops. His basic definition of amount of leakage is equivalent to [4] , so it is an instance of our own definition, as shown in Section 4.4. For the same reason, Malacaria's model is no more precise than our own model [6] . Rate of leakage could be defined in our own model, using Malacaria's techniques, much like the other parameters of leakage given in Section 4.
McIver and Morgan [27] calculate the channel capacity of a program using conditional entropy. They add demonic nondeterminism as well as probabilistic choice to the language of while-programs, and they show that the perfect security (0 bits of leakage) of a program is determined by the behavior of its deterministic refinements. They also consider restricting the power of the demon making the nondeterministic choices, such that it can see all data, or just low data, or no data.
Evfimievski, Gehrke, and Srikant [11] quantify privacy breaches in data mining. In their framework, randomized operators are applied to confidential data before the data is released. A privacy breach occurs when release of the randomized data causes a large change in an attacker's probability distribution on a property of the confidential data. They use Bayesian reasoning, based on observation of randomized data, to update the attacker's distribution. Their distributions are similar to our beliefs, but have the same strong admissibility restriction as Clark et al. [4] . They also show that relative entropy can be used to bound the maximum privacy breach for a randomized operator.
Conclusion
This paper presents a model for incorporating attacker beliefs into analysis of quantitative information flow. Our theory reveals that uncertainty, the traditional metric for information flow, is inadequate: it cannot satisfactorily explain even the simple example of password checking. Information flows when an attacker's belief becomes more accurate, but an uncertainty metric can mistakenly measure a flow of zero or less. Inversely, misinformation flows when an attacker's belief becomes less accurate, but an uncertainty metric can mistakenly measure a positive information flow. Hence, in the presence of beliefs, accuracy is the correct metric for information flow.
We have shown how to use an accuracy metric to calculate exact, expected, and maximum information flow; other parameters of information flow, such as variance, median, and rate, could be defined in the same way. We have demonstrated that our metric generalizes uncertainty metrics. Our formal model of experiments enables precise, compositional reasoning about attackers' actions and beliefs. We have instantiated this model with a probabilistic semantics and have shown that probabilistic choice is essential to producing misinformation. We have also extended the model to enable analysis of information flow due to insiders, who collude with attackers.
If S does not terminate on some input states in δ, then output distribution [[S]]δ will contain less mass than δ; otherwise, δ = [[S]]δ . Missing mass corresponds to nontermination [32, 28] , so out ⊥ maps the missing mass to ⊥.
B Proofs
Note that the immutability of high input can be dispensed with using the technique of Section 3.4.
Proof. Assume S ∈ Det and let E, b H be arbitrary. 
Let o be the observation producing b . It is straightforward to check that if S ∈ Det, then [[S]]σ is the point mass at σ , where σ is the state produced by the standard denotational semantics of while programs, such as Winskel's [39] . So the output of
Output of S is a point mass as argued above, let x be the denominator
Jensen's inequality and convexity of D, see [7] 
Definition of δ|δ L , applied to σ We calculate:
Make the following definitions:
And let b H be the belief mapping σ H to 1/2 and σ H to 1/2.
We have now defined all the variables in experiment E, but we need to define b H ∈ B(E). To that end, we calculate the attacker's prediction δ A : 
Assume S ∈ ObsDet. Let I, σ L be arbitrary. Let δ L be the distribution guaranteed to exist by the definition of ObsDet. Let δ H be arbitrary with δ H = 1. 
Definition of ⊗, one-point rule
Immutable high input, one-point rule
Lemma 8.4 Assume the definitions in the contrapositive proof of Theorem 8. Then:
Proof. 
